|
Peter had stopped by to ask what I would be
teaching the next semester. None of my
planned courses fit his schedule (which didn't
seem to surprise him), so he seemed to be
ready to leave.
But he didn't. Each time he stood up, he
thought of some trivial question, then sat
down again to ask it. I began to think he'd get
leg cramps if he kept this up.
"Why don't you tell me what's really on your
mind?"
"What do you mean? I wanted to know what
you were teaching next semester, and — "
"But you knew that already. And you didn't
really come here to ask about the Semester in
Uzbekistan, or the Internship in
Antinomianism."
"What are you, psychic or something?"
I grinned. "Yes."
"Well," he said, "there is something I've
been wondering about. It's not why I'm here.
But since you bring it up, I guess I
might as well tell you."
"You might as well," I agreed.
"I was talking with my friend Don. You know
him."
"Sure. It's through him that I know you."
"Well, the other day he asked whether I believe
in God, and I didn't know what to tell him."
"You don't know whether God is real?"
"It's not that. I don't know whether I believe in
Him."
"Isn't that the same thing?"
"No. See, I do believe in God. But I don't see
why my belief should be true. So maybe I don't
believe in Him, if you see what I mean."
"Maybe you're trying to say that your belief
doesn't reflect real knowledge, so even
though you believe in God, you also think
maybe you shouldn't. Am I getting warm?
"Yeah, that's it. See, one of my other
professors said that the only reason I believe
in God is that I've been brought up that way. If
I'd been brought up by pagans, probably I'd
believe in lots of gods. If I'd been brought up
by atheists, probably I wouldn't believe in any
god. So I have this belief — but so
what?"
I reached for my coffee. "Peter, tell me
something."
"What?"
"What makes you sure that you believe in God
only because you've been brought up that
way?"
He gave me a funny look. "Because I
was brought up that way. My Dad and
Mom told me God made the world, and I
believed them."
"Did they also teach you 'one plus one is two,
two plus two is four'?"
"Sure."
"Would you say that you believe those
things just because you were brought up that
way?"
He hesitated. "No-o-o. Because I could see for
myself that what they said was true. When I
put one penny with one penny, I got two
pennies."
"So the mere fact that you were brought up to
believe something — "
" — it doesn't show that I don't have other
reasons to believe it. Right. But that's just it.
'One plus one is two' is different from
'God made the world.' I have other reasons to
believe in one plus one, but I don't have other
reasons to believe in God. My parents said
God made the world, I believed them, and it
stuck. It seems to me that's all."
"Did you believe everything they told you?"
"Well, no."
"For instance."
"They told me that if I lost a tooth and put it
under my pillow, the tooth fairy would come
while I was sleeping and leave a quarter in its
place."
"Why didn't you believe them about that?"
"I could never see what use a fairy would have
for a tooth. Besides, some of my friends got
dollars for their teeth, and others didn't get
anything. Then one day I lost a tooth and forgot
to tell my parents, and that night the tooth fairy
didn't come. So I decided the tooth fairy must
be Mom and Dad."
"Very astute. So you believed your parents
when what they told you made sense of other
things you knew, but not when it didn't?"
"I guess so. 'One plus one is two' fit in fine
with what I knew about adding pennies. But
the tooth fairy didn't fit in with how some kids
got dollars and others got nothing, and it didn't
fit in with the time I forgot to tell my parents I'd
lost a tooth."
"It didn't fit in with what you knew about
motives, either."
"What do you mean?"
"You knew that nobody does anything without
a reason. Otherwise it wouldn't have worried
you that you couldn't see what use a fairy
would have for a tooth."
"I guess I did know that about motives. It's
funny to think of a little kid knowing something
like 'Nobody does anything without a reason.' "
He grinned. "I must have been pretty smart,
huh?"
"Children know more about some things than
we give them credit for. So when your parents
told you God made the world, what other facts
did this claim fit in with?"
"I can't think of any at all."
"Tell me this, then. Did they tell you out of the
blue that God made the world, or was it the
answer to some question?"
"It was the answer to a question. I'd asked
them who made the world."
"So it did fit in with something you
already knew."
"What?"
"You already knew that someone had made
the world."
"I didn't know that. I just thought
it."
"All right. But why did you think it?"
"Because even a kid knows that the world
must have come from somewhere."
"Why?"
"Because there's got to be some good reason
for everything."
"That's a rough paraphrase of what
philosophers call the 'principle of sufficient
reason' — that anything that doesn't have to
be requires a cause sufficient to account
for the effect. So you're saying that even as a
child, you had intuitive knowledge of the
principle of sufficient reason."
"I guess that is what I'm saying, Prof."
"And you had intuitive knowledge that the
world is not the sort of thing that 'has to be.'"
"That too. Hey, my kid self is looking smarter
and smarter."
"So it is. But there must have been at least
one other thing you knew in those days."
"Why do you say that?"
"Because you didn't ask what made the
world — you asked who made it."
"I don't think that means anything. That's just
how kids think. They don't know about
impersonal stuff, like gravity and
electromagnetism. They only know about
personal stuff, like Mom baking cookies."
"A lot of people make that claim. But are you
sure it's true? Think back to your own
childhood. Suppose your father had been
reading a book to you and he had asked,
'Where did this picture come from?' How
would you have answered?"
"I would have said 'Someone colored it.'"
"And did you think 'someone' was a person?"
"Yes."
"But now suppose you had been taking a walk
with your father after a rainstorm and he
asked, 'Where did this big puddle come from?'
How would you have answered this time?"
"I would have said 'The rain.'"
"And did you think 'the rain' was a person?"
"No."
"So you knew the difference between personal
and impersonal causes after all."
"Now that you put it that way, I guess I did."
"So what made you think that a personal
rather than impersonal cause made the world
— that it was made by a who and not a
what?"
Peter reflected. "I guess the world must have
seemed more like a picture than a puddle."
"That's a pretty deep intuition. So you're telling
me that even as a child, you understood that
some things might be due to impersonal
causes, but other things could be brought
about only by persons?"
"I guess I am saying that. That's pretty
amazing. I sure didn't know I knew that
stuff."
"We call that kind of knowledge 'latent' or
'implicit.' Latent knowledge is all that you know
without being aware that you know it."
"There must be a lot of latent knowledge."
"There is. In fact, to ask who made the
world and not what made the world, you
would have needed at least one more piece of
latent knowledge. It wouldn't have been
enough to know that some things
require personal causes and others don't."
"Um — right. I would have had to know how
to tell which things need personal causes
and which ones don't. Because I already knew
that the world was one of them.
"Correct."
"But Professor T — "
"Yes?"
"If you asked me how I tell which things
need personal causes, I couldn't tell you."
"All that means is that your knowledge is still
partly latent. It doesn't mean that it isn't
knowledge."
"But wouldn't I make mistakes now and then?
Wouldn't I sometimes get things that do need
personal causes mixed up with things that
don't?"
"No doubt you would. Anyone might. For
example, an archeologist digs up all sorts of
things, and usually he can tell which ones are
artifacts and which ones are just rocks. But
every now and then he might dig up a rock and
mistake it for an artifact."
"So what keeps me from making the same
mistake about the whole world? I think the
world is an artifact, but maybe it's just a rock. I
think it was made by a who, but maybe
it was caused by a what."
"Go back to the principle of sufficient reason."
"Anything that doesn't have to be requires a
cause. Right, we said that. But I don't
know what the — "
"That's only half of the principle."
"Was there another half?"
"Anything that doesn't have to be requires a
cause sufficient to account for the
effect. Remember the puddle and the
picture?"
"Sure."
"The rain could have made the puddle, and
the artist could have made the picture, but the
rain couldn't have made the picture. That
cause wouldn't have been sufficient to account
for the effect."
"All right, I can see that the rain couldn't cause
a picture. But without even knowing all the
different kinds of what that there are,
how do I know that there isn't a single
what that could have been sufficient to
cause the world?"
"Think of it this way. Would you agree that the
world has both whos and whats
in it?"
"That's pretty obvious."
"And would you also agree that a who
is greater than a what?"
"What do you mean?"
"For one thing, a what can make a
what, and a who can make a
what, but only a who can make a
who."
"That seems true."
"Now put those two points together. If only a
who can make a who, and the
world includes whos, then only a who could
make the world."
Peter's eyes widened. "So when I was a kid —
and I asked who made the world — "
"Go on," I said.
" — I was asking the right question."
"You were. You knew intuitively that a powerful
who was responsible. What you didn't
know was who He was."
We were silent for a few moments. Peter
asked, "Why doesn't everyone know this
stuff?"
"Deep down," I said, "I think everyone does. It's
like what a great teacher of my faith wrote in a
letter to one of the early churches: 'For since
the creation of the world God's invisible
qualities — his eternal power and divine
nature — have been clearly seen, being
understood from what has been made, so
that men are without excuse.' " *
Peter frowned. "Without excuse for what?"
I smiled. "For pretending they don't know what
even a child can see."
*Romans 1:20, emphasis added.
If you have questions you’d like to Ask Theo,
send us an email and we'll pass it along to him.
Copyright © 2002 J. Budziszewski. All rights
reserved. International copyright secured.
|